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Pizarro-Ortega v. Cervantes-Lopez, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 37 (June 22, 2017)1 
TORTS: COMPUTATION OF FUTURE MEDICAL DAMAGES 
Summary 
The court held that future medical expenses are a category of damages to which NRCP 
16.1(a)(1)(C)’s computation requirement applies, and that a plaintiff is not absolved of complying 
with NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C) simply because the plaintiff’s treating physician has indicated in medical 
records that future medical care is necessary. 
  
Background 
 Appellant Miriam Pizarro-Ortega caused a car accident that injured respondents Christian 
Cervantes-Lopez and Maria Avarca.  Respondents filed suit against Pizarro-Ortega for Negligence. 
During litigation, Dr. Stuart Kaplan, a neurosurgeon, informed Christian that he would require a 
lumbar fusion surgery at some point in the future as treatment for his injuries sustained in the 
accident. Christian’s medical records noted this recommendation, and were provided to appellant 
as part of respondent’s initial disclosures.  
 However, respondents never provided appellant with a cost computation for the future 
surgery. Appellant argues that respondents were required by NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C) to provide a cost 
computation for future medical expenses. They therefore filed a motion in limine seeking to 
prevent respondents from introducing evidence at trial in support of Christian’s future medical 
expenses. The district court denied this motion and allowed Dr. Kaplan to testify at trial that the 
surgery would cost $224,100. Appellants then called her own expert witness who testified that 
$120,000 was an accurate estimate of what a lumbar fusion surgery would cost. Ultimately, the 
jury awarded Christian $200,000 for his future lumbar fusion surgery.  
Appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the court had committed 
reversible error in allowing respondents to introduce evidence of Christian’s future medical 
expenses because respondents had not provided a computation of those expenses. The district 
Court denied appellant’s motion giving rise to the subject appeal.  
 
Discussion 
Appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her request for 
a new trial. NRCP 59(a) lists several grounds upon which a new trial may be awarded, including 
an abuse of discretion that prevents a party from having a fair trial. However, the existence of one 
or more grounds for mistrial listed in NRCP 59(a) does not warrant a new trial unless it “materially 
affect[ed] the substantial rights of [the] aggrieved party.”2 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1  By Andrew Hart. 
2  See Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 74, 319 P.3d 606, 611 (2014). 
 
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C) and future medical expenses 
 
 Under NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C), a party is required to produce, “without awaiting a discovery 
request … [a] computation of any category of damage claimed.” Respondents cited the Court’s 
decision in FCH1, LLC v. Rodriquez3 to argue that the Court has approved of the general 
understanding amongst Nevada attorneys practicing in state court that there is no requirement to 
provide a cost computation for future medical expenses. However, respondent’s interpretation of 
the decision in FCH1 was incorrect. That case addressed a plaintiff’s required disclosures under 
NRCP 16.1(a)(2)(B) and did not address, much less abrogate, a plaintiff’s responsibilities under 
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C). Additionally, the difficulty of providing a precise dollar figure for a future 
surgery is not a valid basis for disregarding NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C). Therefore, to the extent that the 
district court absolved respondents of their obligation to provide a computation of Christian’s 
future medical expenses based on FCH1 or a general understanding amongst Nevada practitioners, 
doing so was an error of law.  
 However, to grant a new-trial based on one of the grounds outlined in NRCP 59(a), that 
ground must have “materially affect[ed] the substantial rights of [the] aggrieved party.” In this 
case, the appellant did not contest that Christian’s future surgery is necessary, but only whether 
the testified-to cost of that surgery is reasonable. She elicited opinions from her own medical expert 
about what a reasonable price of that surgery would be. Also, she gave no explanation about what 
further testimony her expert witness could have provided had he been given more time to review 
Dr. Kaplan’s cost estimate. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the jury did give credence to 
appellant’s medical expert because the amount awarded for Christian’s surgery was less than Dr. 
Kaplan’s estimate. For these reasons, the district court was within its discretion to deny a new trial.  
 
Additional arguments  
 
Appellant raised several additional arguments in support of her new trial motion. However, 
she did not demonstrate that her substantial rights were materially affected by any of these possible 
grounds for granting a new trial.  
 
Exclusion of appellant’s medical billing expert 
 
 Appellant proffered a registered nurse, Tami Rockholt, to testify as a “medical billing 
expert” regarding the reasonableness of respondents’ past medical expenses and argued that the 
district court’s decision to strike Rockholt as a witness is grounds for a new trial. However, 
Appellant failed to demonstrate that her substantial rights were materially affected by this decision 
and so the issue does not warrant a new trial. Especially considering that appellant’s medical expert 
was allowed to testify regarding the reasonableness of respondents’ past medical expenses based 
on Nurse Rockholt’s opinions. 
  
 Attorney misconduct 
 
 Next, appellant argued that respondents counsel engaged in misconduct during closing 
arguments by making a “golden rule” argument, which is prohibited under Lioce v. Cohen.4 Under 
                                                     
3  130 Nev. Adv. Op. 46, 335 P.3d 183 (2014). 
4  124 Nev. 1, 20-23, 174 P.3d 970, 982-84 (2008). 
Lioce, “attorneys violate the ‘golden rule’ by [(1)] asking the jurors to place themselves in the 
plaintiff’s position or [(2)] nullify the jury’s role by asking it to ‘send a message’ to the defendant 
instead of evaluating the evidence.”5 However, counsel did not necessarily ask jurors to place 
themselves in respondents’ position. Also, to the extent that counsel’s comments could be 
construed as asking the jurors to “send a message,” counsel asked the jury to do so based on the 
evidence, which is permissible.6 Thus, counsel’s comments did not amount to an improper golden 
rule argument, and a new trial due to attorney misconduct is unwarranted.7  
 
Exclusion of medical lien evidence 
 
 Finally, appellant argued that a new trial is warranted because the district court abused its 
discretion by excluding evidence that respondents’ treating doctors who had obtained medical 
liens. While appellant is correct that evidence of medical liens may be relevant to show bias 
depending upon the lien’s terms, this Court recently recognized that the degree of relevance is 
“limited,” particularly when the medical liens indicate the plaintiff will still be responsible for his 
or her medical bills if he or she does not obtain a favorable judgment.8 The district court excluded 
the evidence of the medical liens finding that the lien’s probative value would be substantially 
outweighed by the unfairly prejudicial effect of coloring respondents’ doctors as liars.9 In light of 
the medical liens’ limited relevance and appellant’s failure to address the district court’s basis for 
determining the liens unfairly prejudicial, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion. Accordingly, this alleged error does not warrant a new trial.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Court’s opinion in FCH1, LLC v. Rodriquez does not absolve a party of his or her 
obligation under NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C) to provide a computation of future medical damages that are 
to be sought at trial. The district court erred in permitting respondents to introduce evidence in 
support of future medical damages. However, because appellant has not shown that her substantial 
rights were not materially affected, this error does not warrant a new trial. The district court’s 
judgment on the jury verdict was affirmed.  
 
                                                     
5  Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 368-69, 212 P.3d 1068, 1082 (2009) (quoting Lioce, 124 Nev. at 
20-23, 174 P.3d at 982-84 (emphasis added)). 
6  Gunderson, 130 Nev. at 77-78, 319 P.3d at 613-14. 
7  Lioce, 124 Nev. at 20, 174 P.3d at 982; see NEV. R. CRIM. P. 59(a)(2) 
8  Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 52, 377 P.3d 81, 94 (2016).  
9  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035(1) (2015).  
 
